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Abstract. There are two different approaches in this study with different implications. The 
first approach and the main aim of this study is a methodological framework. There are 
different frameworks in solving game theory topics involving at least two Nash Equilib-
riums. This study presents a new framework for developing this part of game theory with 
MCDM framework. The authors believe that at least there is a perspective or paradigm 
behind each game theory topic, leading to the development of strategies accordingly. 
For this purpose a hybrid MCDM method based on SWARA-WASPAS is applied in the 
process of research for evaluating the strategies. The general topic of this research is in 
supply chain management field. This research also focuses on this issue and implies ex-
tend of the complication involved. An additional focus in the present paper is on defining 
a game. This research addresses developing strategies from only stable strategies to both 
normal and dynamic strategies. The topic is established to find the best mixed strategy 
considering current international and economical position of Iran against complicated 
international relations’ issues and specially sanction. 
Keywords: game theory, Nash Equilibrium, MCDM, SWARA, WASPAS, supply chain 
management, strategy evaluation.
JEL Classification: C44, C68, C90, M11, L11.
Introduction
This study isn’t only a classical research based on game theory and MCDM methods. 
Game theory and MCDM framework are the multi-disciplinary approaches to solve the 
problems and make decisions, classically under these approaches a normal or a stable 
situation and environment may be considered. 
Making decision in critical and complicated topics needs a more flexible approach. This 
research is organized to illustrate a new flexible dynamic decision regarding tough is-
sues. This research is focused on a supply chain management (SCM) topic. 
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The research will start with a classic game theory model. Although the model of game 
theory is unique in this research, the approach is normal and stable. The model of this 
research is based on a new approach. There is a new perspective to make a more flex-
ible strategy for selecting the best alternative as a supplier. More information will be 
ready in sections 5 and 6.
The main contribution will start from this step. When there are at least two Nash Equi-
libriums, what do researchers do? The answer is easy; there is more than a single answer 
for a topic. As everyone knows there is always a goal, perspective or paradigm behind a 
game theory issue. Now, the big question is: why the decision makers did not evaluate 
Nash Equilibriums? This study presents an approach for this notion based on MCDM 
framework.
Another important part of this study is applying a hybrid MCDM method based on 
SWARA-WASPAS. This hybrid methodology is applied for evaluating the criteria 
and mixed strategies (Nash Equilibriums). Consequently, strategy evaluation based on 
MCDM methodology was considered for decision making when there are more than 
two Nash Equilibriums. The importance of this new framework can be more useful in 
decision and policy making. 
The rest of the research starting from literature review includes: game theory, MCDM, 
supply chain management (SCM); methodology; case study; describing strategies; ex-
perts information; results and finally conclusion.
1. Literature review
In this section a brief review of game theory and MCDM is presented in separate sec-
tions. The history of these two fields can be seen in the following sections. 
1.1. Game theory
Different means are available to approach strategic conflicts (Li et al. 2004), such as 
metagame analysis (Howard 1971), hypergame analysis (Bennett 1980; Wang et al. 
1988), conflict analysis (Fraser, Hipel 1984), the Graph model for conflict resolution 
(GMCR) (Kilgour et al. 1987; Fang et al. 1993), drama theory (Howard 1999), and 
the theory of moves (Brams 1994), all with the same game-theoretic origin (Kilgour 
1995). A strategic game has different constituents, set of players, strategies for each 
player and the reward for each strategy combination. The strategy defines the particular 
way a player has to act under certain circumstances (Banerjee et al. 2006; Soner Aplak, 
Ziya Sogut 2013). Game theory has been applied to many realms such as economics, 
political science and psychology, logic and biology (Nash 1950; 1953; Gibbons 1991; 
Li et al. 2013).
By game theory the mathematical theory of interactive decision situations is made pos-
sible (Mohammadi Limaei 2010). To clarify strategies that individuals must adopt when 
competing or co-operating in games (Binmore 1994), game theory presents helpful 
mathematical tools. Social sciences (mainly economics), biology, engineering, politi-
cal science, international relations, computer science and philosophy (Burguillo 2010) 
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have been the areas to which this branch of applied mathematics can be used. In every 
situation agents make decisions and based upon them the certain results will emerge, 
accordingly each agent has his/her way of dealing with the possible outcomes (Fiestras-
Janeiro et al. 2011). The purpose of game theory is to model situations in which many 
participants, whose interactions affect each other’s outcomes, take part (Nisan et al. 
2007). Interactive behavior of decision-making and interests in situations in which a 
DM’s behavior affects not only their own profits or losses but also those of opposing 
DMs, will be studied. Game theory doesn’t necessarily mean obtaining an otherwise 
unavailable problem solution but rather urges strategic thinking targeted at resolving 
the decision problem. As an example, the game theory formulation adds time to the 
decision process (Reneke 2009).
It is proven that game theory is an asset in the modeling and analysis of many phenom-
ena including interaction between multiple agents (Rego, Halpern 2012).
The salient elements of a game include (1) the players, (2) the strategies or preferences 
they adopt, (3) the information at hand, (4) the order of play, and (5) the outcome or 
payoff of the game, which is influenced by the previous four factors. A game has at 
least two players who make decisions; these players can be individuals, communities, 
corporations, or the government. Every player has his/her own preference and strategy 
that means “a complete plan of action that describes what a player will do under all 
possible circumstances” (Davis 1997; Law, Pan 2009).
It is important to clarify the territory between the game and the game theory trying to 
understand the research point of view. Taxonomies of strategic situations are called 
games but a mathematical derivation analyzing the cognitive abilities of player’s strate-
gies is known to be game theory (Camerer 2003; Sharma, Bhattacharya 2013).
Game theory issues are often multi-criteria multi-decision-maker problems. In order to 
solve such problems by conventional optimization methods, normally the problem is 
changed completely to a single-decision maker problem with a single composite objec-
tive for the whole system such as an overall economic or social welfare function or a 
weighted constrained multi-objective function (Madani 2010). Since the seminal book 
by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) “Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior”, it is very much common to divide game theory into two main groups of 
interaction situations (which are called games), i.e. non-cooperative and cooperative 
games. Non-cooperative games study situations in which players find it hard to reach 
an agreement over a conflict. Meanwhile in cooperative games there is a possibility of 
all types of agreement among the players (Moretti, Vasilakos 2010). In non-cooperative 
games each player tends to behave in his own interest taking into consideration that the 
outcome of a game has to do with the actions of all the players involved. Actions by 
players can take place at the same time (the ‘stone, paper, scissors’ game or the ‘match-
ing pennies’ game) or at several time points (chess, backgammon) (Moretti, Vasilakos 
2010). The main application of matrix games is the selection of variants, which is a 
problem of multi-criteria decisions (Peldschus 2007, 2008; Meszek 2001, 2004, 2007, 
2013; Zagorskas, Turskis 2006; Kaplinski, Tamosaitiene 2010).
S. Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. Multiple Nash Equilibriums and evaluation of strategies. New application ...
293
1.2. Multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM)
The traditional MCDM provides us with options to select the best solution. Nonetheless, 
Simon, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978, asserts that decision making 
does not necessarily follow the basic tenets of the “rational man”. Humans do not solve 
problems through maximizing utility, but are “satisfiers” who set aspiration levels that a 
solution must satisfy. If humans can identify a solution that satisfies the stated aspiration 
levels, they accept the solution (Liou, Tzeng 2012).
With the development of MCDM, the focus has been diverted from ranking and select-
ing alternatives to improving their performance. The old models can only help us to 
identify the gaps between competing alternatives (Liou, Tzeng 2012). Multiple-criteria 
decision making (MCDM), commonly known as multi criteria decision aid (MCDA) 
and multi-criteria analysis (MCA), is a set of methods in which the aggregation and 
consideration of numerous (often conflicting) criteria to choose, rank, sort or describe 
a set of alternatives to aid a decision process is allowed (Zopounidis 1999; Mulliner 
et al. 2013). Multi-criteria analysis is quiet helpful to determine the best solution among 
several options based upon multiple-attributes or criteria (Chang, Hsu 2009). The pur-
pose of MCDA is to support decision makers, who encounter numerous and conflicting 
choices (Lootsma 1999; Barfod et al. (2011). The Multiple-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) approach is taken to assess advantages and disadvantages of options on the 
basis of multiple-criteria especially when there is a variety of options with multiple, 
potential conflicting dimensions which cannot be evaluated by the measurement of a 
simple, single dimension (Vreeker et al. 2002; Postorino, Pratico 2012).
All MCDM techniques that have three steps are mentioned here (Triantaphyllou 2000; 
Hyde, Maier 2006):
1. Determining pertinent criteria and alternatives; 
2. Attaching numerical measures to the relative importance of the criteria and to the 
impacts of the alternative on these criteria; 
3. Process the numerical values to determine a ranking of each alternative.
1.3. Supply chain management (SCM)
Some different enterprises sharing common information and logistic networks are taken 
into account by the supply chains. Because of distributed nature of the system and the 
decisional autonomy of heterogeneous decision centers, ordering the tasks and activities 
raises certain problems of coordination and integration (Hennet, Arda 2008).
The main tenets of those chains are that the firms in the chain are independent actors 
who seek to optimize their individual objectives, and that the decisions taken by a 
firm can also have effects on the performance of the other parties in the supply chain. 
Alignment and coordination of actions are needed in order for these interactions among 
firms’ decisions to happen, hence, game theory is the proper method to handle these 
interactions (Fiestras-Janeiro et al. 2011).
Because of the corporate structure and the market globalization in the recent years, 
industries have to become more competitive, and try to achieve more benefits, reduce 
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losses; they also need to improve the quality of services and products, etc. But we 
shouldn’t underestimate the fact that the efficiency of a company may be hampered by 
the efficiency of its supply chain management procedures (Zamarripa et al. 2012). Cur-
rently there are many research groups working on developing of systematic methods 
to improve decision making at its different hierarchical levels; these methods include 
the tactical decision level which has proven to be one of the most important for the 
day-to-day SC optimization (Zamarripa et al. 2013). Also Zamarripa et al. (2013) pre-
sented a framework from applications of game theory in SC. The framework is shown 
in Figure 1. 
In this section a case is presented as an example to illustrate methodology of this re-
search. Consider a special situation like Iran’s position in the world. A problem like 
sanctions against Iran has many outcomes. Many companies and organizations nearly 
bankrupted and eventually Iran has suffered greatly from economic problems. There are 
two approaches for Iranian companies to select their suppliers. Companies have seen 
what happens if some problems such as sanctions take place. There are two players for 
this research. The first one is a good foreign supplier company and the other one is a 
good internal supplier company. 
This research is organized generally and considers the general position of companies 
and their situations. The main focus of this research is on methodology and strategies 
selection and evaluation. In the next steps there shall be the significant point of show-
ing differences in decision making from different aspects, paradigms and situations. 
The case is based on general visions and international position of Iran presented by 
the Iranian government. This research will apply game theory and MCDM framework 
dynamically. 
Fig. 1. Use of the game theory as a tool to manage SC under uncertainty  
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As mentioned before, in special situations, MCDM methods can be helpful in the de-
cision making process with game theory. If an issue has more than one similar Nash 
Equilibrium, this developed methodology can be useful. In real cases, the events of a 
similar nature are numerous, but supply chain management is an important issue in Iran. 
One of the critical issues in the terrible inflation in Iran is SCM topic. 
In the next step, at first strategies will be presented and followed by the game theory 
model.
2. Methodology
Any situation in which people or animals interact is called a game; and strategies are 
the plans of action of the players. Any profile of strategies – one for each player – in 
which each player’s strategy is a best reaction to the strategies of the other players is 
called Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium in game theory is a solution concept of a game including two or more 
players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other 
players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy 
unilaterally (Nash, 1950; Mohammadi Limaei 2010). The outcome of the strategic in-
teraction of several decision makers can be put under analysis by the Nash equilibrium 
concept. 
Why Nash equilibrium has to be this much important? At least two reasons can be 
mentioned. First, if a game has a rational solution that is known to all the players, then 
it must be equilibrium. Rationally speaking, players have to play optimally even if some 
of the players would have to believe that it is rational for them not to make their best 
reply to what they know the other players are going to do. The second reason is more 
important. If the payoffs are to be in proportion to how fit the players are then evolu-
tionary processes – either cultural or biological – the more fit players will be selected 
and the evolutionary process dispenses with the weak ones (Mohammadi Limaei 2010).
This research is aimed at answering the question: when in an issue there is more than 
one NE and both of them are the same, which one is better? Which strategy is more 
important? What should be the process of decision making? 
The intersection of game theory and MCDM is here. Paradigms, political and social 
priority, regulation and some other issues are effective in the process of decision mak-
ing. But game theory can’t respond to all aspects of needs. MCDM can be applied in 
this part to evaluate strategies. MCDM methods can direct an issue to goals. Each model 
can be evaluation based on MCDM methodology and results can be more helpful and 
practical. But this research is focused only on those topics in which there are at least two 
Nash Equilibriums and the study is based on strategies evaluation of Nash equilibriums.
In this research, important criteria are presented as a model for evaluating strategies, 
then two MCDM methods are applied for evaluating strategies and criteria. At the first 
step SWARA method is applied for evaluating criteria and model of research. SWARA 
weighted all criteria and then WASPAS method is used for evaluating strategies. The 
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output of this research is selection of one strategy among others. As a matter of fact this 
new hybrid methodology can select the best Nash Equilibriums for the decision maker. 
Again it should be borne in mind that this new hybrid model is useful in cases where 
there is more than one similar Nash Equilibrium. 
2.1. Step-wise weight assessment ratio analysis (SWARA) method 
SWARA method, a new brand MADM method, can be used instead of AHP, ANP 
and FARE methods. SWARA is introduced by Kersuliene et al. (2010) and developed 
significantly in recent years. SWARA can be called an expert-oriented method for the 
experts’ opinions have the considerable importance role in evaluations and calculating 
weights in the process of this method. For the next step, experts evaluate the value of 
each criterion and rank all the criteria from the first to the last one. After that the impor-
tance of each criterion is calculated and all the criteria are ranked from the first to the 
last one (from the most significant to the least significant); experts’ implicit knowledge 
information and experiences will be the benchmark. The overall ranks of the group of 
experts are chosen based on the mediocre value of ranks (Kersuliene, Turskis 2011). 
One of the effective and powerful attributes of SWARA method is its ability to estimate 
experts’ point of view on importance ratio of the criteria in the process of their weight 
determination (Kersuliene et al. 2010). In order for experts to collect and organize data 
SWARA can also be helpful. The simplicity of the mentioned process allows the experts 
to work together easily (Hashemkhani Zolfani, Zavadskas 2013).
Priorities can be set with respect to companies or countries’ policies without any need 
to evaluate and rank the criteria which is one of the other salient attributes of SWARA 
method that is different from other methods such as AHP and ANP.
Due to the fact that the latter will be affected by experts’ evaluations priorities and the 
ranks, the model is created based on criteria. In conclusion, SWARA, based upon this 
analysis, is a useful method and is recommended to be applied in certain environments 
of decision making (Hashemkhani Zolfani, Zavadskas 2013). The all past and recent 
researches with SWARA methodology are presented below: 
Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. (2013a) in product design; Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. 
(2013b) in investigating on the success factors of online games based on explorer; 
Hashemkhani Zolfani, Zavadskas (2013) in sustainable development of rural areas’ 
building structures based on local climate; Hashemkhani Zolfani, Saparauskas (2013) 
in prioritizing sustainability assessment indicators of energy system; Alimardani et al. 
2013 in agile supplier selection; Hashemkhani Zolfani, Seyed Agha Banihashemi (2014) 
in personnel selection and Hashemkhani Zolfani, Bahrami (2014) in investment prior-
itizing in high-tech industries. 
2.2. Weighted aggregates sum product assessment (WASPAS)
This recently presented method is known as one of the newest methods proposed by Sci-
entifics. This new methodology hinges on Weighted Sum Model (WSM) and Weighted 
Product Model (WPM). Zavadskas et al. (2012) are the innovators of this new method 
and they have proven the better accuracy of these aggregated methods in comparison 
to the accuracy of one of them. 
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WASPAS calculation is based on these steps:
2.2.1. Normalized decision making matrix based on:
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2.2.2. Calculating WASPAS weighted and normalized decision  
making matrix for summarizing part:
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2.2.4. Final calculating for evaluating and prioritizing alternatives based on:
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The all researchers who have used the WASPAS method up to now are described in 
several sources:
Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. (2013c) decision making on business issues with foresight 
perspective; Dejus, Antucheviciene (2013) assessment of health and safety solutions at 
a construction site; and Vafaeipour et al. (2014) in assessment of regions priority for 
implementation of solar plants.
3. Describing strategies 
Beske et al. (2014) present two different frameworks for evaluating suppliers. The first 
one is belonging to normal situation and current situation and the other one is about 
dynamic collaborations. 
The criteria (strategies) of the first framework (Normal situation) are: Orientation (S1–1) 
(dedication to SCM), Supply chain continuity (S1–2), Collaboration level (S1–3), Risk 
management (S1–4), and Pro–activity (S1–5). 
The criteria (strategies) of the second framework (Dynamic collaboration) are: Knowl-
edge assessment (S2–1), Partner development (S2–2), Supply chain re-conceptualization 
(S2–3), Co–evolving (S2–4), and Reflexive control (S2–5).
Generally these frameworks are suitable considering Iran’s situation in international 
cooperation. International cooperation is such a complicated issue for Iran because most 
part of industries in Iran is still related to government. Iran also isn’t a member of World 
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Trade Organization (WTO) and sanctions made a tough situation for all companies and 
industries. Today working with international partners as a part of supply chain manage-
ment is full of threats. This methodology will be a good solution for making decision 
in this tough issue.
The game theory model of this research is presented in Table 1 based on experts’ ideas.
The main point of this model is to find the best strategy for evaluating suppliers with 
both normal and dynamic perspectives in different strategies. Companies in Iran should 
find the suppliers which are powerful in both dynamic and normal situations. It means 
this model can help decision makers to make decisions if some strategies are more 
important than the others. In fact this new methodology can help decision makers to 
make decision with account of all important perspectives, issues and criteria based on 
complicated situations.
As the model shows, four important strategies are involved in this research as the effec-
tive strategies in making an appropriate mixed strategy. The three Nash Equilibriums in 
this research are: (S1–4–S2–3, S1–3–S2–4, S1–4–S2–4).
In the traditional models of game theory, this research is conducted and the results will 
be three Nash Equilibriums. But the present research is focused on some issues after 
this situation. Always there are general concepts about issues. Which Nash Equilibrium 
will be better for us? Which Nash Equilibrium will be the best due to our policies and 
attitudes? This research will answer these questions. 
Table 1. Game theory model of research
S1\S2 S2–1 S2–2 S2–3 S2–4 S2–5
S1–1 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 6.7
S1–2 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.5
S1–3 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.8 7.7
S1–4 7.6 7.5 7.8 7.8 7.6
S1–5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.5
4. Important criteria
This part is organized only for illustrating the important criteria for evaluating the strate-
gies (NEs). These criteria are absolutely important merely due to Iran’s situation. The 
first criterion surely is empowerment level (C1). In the last century Iran always tried 
to have more progress in industry and technology. Undoubtedly, the cooperation with 
suppliers should happen in this field. 
The second criterion is the level of supplying risk (C2). How is it possible to reduce the 
risk? Which strategy is more suitable? 
The third criterion is the strategic relation (C3) among companies and countries. Un-
doubtedly, political and strategic relation between countries is very important.
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The fourth criterion will be future opportunities (C4). The dimensions of these opportu-
nities are future cooperation in a new market, new developments, etc.
5. Experts’ information 
Two groups of experts participated in this study. A group for the game theory section 
and analyses of that and another group for MCDM section (SWARA-WASPAS). The 
information about experts is presented in their section.
Game theory section
Five experts participated in this part. Four academic researchers in the field of supply 
chain management (SCM) and an academic researcher in the field of game theory have 
cooperated with the authors. They defined the values for game theory model from the 
worst to best from 1–9. 
MCDM section
Four researchers of SCM field cooperated with the authors again. Two researchers in 
the public policy and a researcher in the futures studies joined the previous researchers 
in the previous section. They worked together to prioritize the criteria and weight them 
as well as find the alternatives being four Nash equilibriums. 
6. Results
This section is organized for the strategies evaluation. There are four Nash equilibriums 
but which one can be preferred? This is the question that this section will answer. Two 
MCDM methods are applied in this section. After identifying the important criteria for 
evaluating the strategies, SWARA method is applied for evaluating the criteria and cal-
culating the relative importance of them. In the next step WASPAS method is applied 
for evaluating and selecting the best Nash equilibrium of this research. 
6.1. SWARA methods’ results
As mentioned before, SWARA method is applied for weighting and evaluating the 
criteria in the strategies evaluation phase. There are four important criteria and in this 
step, based on SWARA method’s general framework, the criteria are evaluated. As the 
experts’ evaluation level of supplying risk is the most significant and strategic relation, 
empowerment level and future opportunities are of secondary importance. Also the 
weight of each criterion is specified in Table 2.






















C2 1 1.0000 0.3094
C3 0.1571 1.1571 0.8642 0.2674
C1 0.1741 1.1741 0.7361 0.2277
C4 0.1643 1.1643 0.6322 0.1956
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6.2. WASPAS methods’ results
This section is organized based on the results of SWARA method section. Three mixed 
strategies are evaluated in this section. WASPAS methodology is applied in this section 
for the final evaluation of strategies. Final decision making is done based on WASPAS 
methodology. The process of calculating WASPAS is shown in Tables 3–7. 
Decision making matrix is established based on the experts’ opinions. The average 
of their evaluation is considered in this study. Moreover, all criteria are considered as 
qualitative criteria. 
Table 3. Decision making matrix
C1 C2 C3 C4
Weight 0.2277 0.3094 0.2674 0.1956
Max/Min Max Min Max Max
S1–3–S2–4 7.000 6.143 6.857 6.143
S1–4–S2–3 6.143 5.286 6.286 7.000
S1–4–S2–4 6.286 6.571 6.857 6.143
Table 4. Normalized decision making matrix
C1 C2 C3 C4
Weight 0.2277 0.3094 0.2674 0.1956
Max/Min Max Min Max Max
S1–3–S2–4 1.000 0.860 1.000 0.878
S1–4–S2–3 0.878 1.000 0.917 1.000
S1–4–S2–4 0.898 0.804 1.000 0.878
Table 5.Weighted and normalized decision making matrix for summarizing part
C1 C2 C3 C4
Max/Min Max Min Max Max
S1–3–S2–4 0.228 0.266 0.267 0.172
S1–4–S2–3 0.200 0.309 0.245 0.196
S1–4–S2–4 0.204 0.249 0.267 0.172
Table 6. Weighted and normalized decision making matrix for multiplication part
C1 C2 C3 C4
Max/Min Max Min Max Max
S1–3–S2–4 1.000 0.955 1.000 0.975
S1–4–S2–3 0.971 1.000 0.977 1.000
S1–4–S2–4 0.976 0.935 1.000 0.975
S. Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. Multiple Nash Equilibriums and evaluation of strategies. New application ...
301

















S1–3–S2–4 0.4665 0.4652 0.9317 2
S1–4–S2–3 0.4750 0.4742 0.9492 1
S1–4–S2–4 0.4462 0.4446 0.8908 3
According to the results of WASPAS methodology for evaluating the mixed strategies, 
S1–3–S2–4 is the best mixed strategy for this research in supplier cooperation strategies. 
This result can be considered as a core in suppliers’ evaluation and selection. 
This is a new perspective in the process of selecting the suppliers. This new framework 
considers many aspects of importance in a package. The real environment of decision 
making is really complicated and decision makers should consider all aspects in their 
decisions. 
Conclusions
There were two main aims of this research. The first one was about developing game 
theory with MCDM framework in a special situation. The second one was about solv-
ing complexity of decision making in the process of supplier evaluation and selection. 
Within a scope of unique methodological framework, authors look deeper to the Nash 
Equilibrium concept. When there will be at least two similar Nash Equilibriums answers 
for an issue, what are able to do the decision makers?
Always there is at least a perspective or paradigm behind each game theory topic. There 
is the available option of evaluating the perspective much better. MCDM framework 
can be helpful when evaluating the Nash Equilibriums. There is a different but related 
research that can be considered in the study as a sub-part of the study. As an application 
of MCDM framework, a new hybrid methodology (SWARA-WASPAS) presented by 
Hashemkhani Zolfani et al. (2013c) is applied in this research. In this research relative 
importance and weight is considered for strategies. Strategies’ weights made difference 
and decision makers could make decision easily about Nash Equilibriums points. 
Making decisions with class frameworks like MCDM or even game theory is incom-
plete. Classic frameworks usually consider only very limited aspects and situations. It 
is possible only to analyze stable environments and limited situations. It is possible to 
consider many different aspects under this methodology. Different classic frameworks 
with a related string among them constitute the total idea of this research. 
One of the critical and complicated issues in the real world decision making regards 
supplier selection and evaluation. This topic was selected for this research to illustrate 
the ability and capacity of this new framework. This topic is organized based on general 
position of Iran in the international relations and also is related to 1404 (2025) perspec-
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tive of Iran. Also there is a hard economical situation in Iran because of the sanctions 
and because of this complicated situation this methodology and research can be useful.
There, moreover, was a new perspective in defining a game in game theory process 
and that was making a decision for a mixed strategy. There was a base strategy regard-
ing normal situations. But the model has tried to make mix strategies that can enable 
competent decision makers to evaluate suppliers based on both stable and dynamic 
perspectives.
The study shows how this new framework can be effective in policy-makers’ future 
decisions about critical issues when at least two different Nash Equilibriums exist. 
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